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1I
INTRODUCTION
The potential for military conflict among two or more states is probably a function of a range of
political, social, economic, religious, historical, ethnic and racial differences between them.
Nonetheless, while these factors may provide the underlying foci for conflict, they do not provide
the economic and military potential necessary for the successful prosecution of war.
An analysis of the likelihood of potential armed conflict within a given time frame, therefore,
needs to look at the more immediate capability for war independent of the underlying causative
factors for such a conflict. This examination would involve the analysis of a large number and
variety of inputs that are vital to the conduct of military conflict. Such an analysis is what this
author terms a “Net Assessment” which is aimed at identifying specific strengths and weaknesses.
The various areas that would need to be analyzed to develop such an assessment for the states
involved could include:
• National Goals1
• Command Structure2
• Basic Resources3
• Applied Resources4
• Conventional Military Capabilities (land, air, and sea)5
• Order of Battle (Orbat)
• The Strategic Balance6
Net Assessments are usually done in four phases (Compile, Certify, Combine, and Compare)
using a variety of data sources. Academic and scholarly assessments necessarily have to rely on
published data ignoring any possibility of errors therein. Government assessments would be based
on more detailed and accurate information of at least one’s own capabilities; and data collected
through intelligence agencies for other states--which may not necessarily be more accurate than
published information.7
                                                
1
 Including such national security interests as survival, stability, international credibility, history, role playing, political
objectives, military aims.
2
 Including: Higher Command, C3I in peace and war, intelligence gathering, political structures, military organization,
headquarters, field forces.
3
 Including: population and demographics, the economy , industry, agriculture, trade and commerce, natural resources, raw
materials, petroleum products, science & technological capabilities.
4
 Including: terrain, main geographical features, likely axes of attack, man made obstacles, national logistics, road network,
rail network, air links, merchant marine and ports, civil communication links, defense-related industry, defense related R & D.
5
 Including: weapons platforms and systems, military manpower (quantitative and qualitative) and reserves, fire power,
mobility, command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (c4i).
6
 Including: fissile materials, nuclear capable delivery systems, other WMD, command & control, civil defense.
7
 On the whole, data sources from the International Institute for Strategic Studies is considered internationally to be reliable
enough to provide the base for a reasonably accurate assessment of conventional military capabilities.
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An exercise of this type, regularly updated, could provide a viable gauge for measuring
changes in military linked potential which, when accompanied by other warning signs, could
indicate an increase in the likelihood of armed conflict.
II
BACKGROUND
In the mid 1990s a significant number of American and other scholars, including much of the non-
proliferation community, seemed to believe that tensions between India and Pakistan, over
Kashmir in particular, had reached the point where war seemed inevitable and nuclear war a
distinct possibility in the near future. Was there any empirical evidence, based on an examination
of significant economic and military factors in both countries as they had evolved over the period
1985 to 1995 to support this view? Hence the need for a Net Assessment for India and Pakistan.
With this end in view, the publicly available literature was examined to see what work had been
done on this subject. It was surprising to find that no such comprehensive analysis of the South
Asian military environment, comparable to the kind of outstanding analytical work done in the
context of the United States–USSR, the Israel–Arab Forces, the Koreas, or China–Taiwan was
available. Some analysis of some aspects of the Indo–Pak military relationship are done
periodically but nothing that compares with these other ‘hot spot’ assessments and nothing
adequate in the current circumstances. The question of attempting a “Net Assessment” ab initio
was, therefore, well beyond the capability and scope of this project.
As a starting point we have assembled a preliminary but comprehensive data base for the two
countries relying entirely on published sources. With this step we have initiated an analysis of the
military balance on the “bean count” model. At this stage it would be useful to point out that this is
the most simplistic way of assessing the balance—totting up and comparing the numbers of such
weapons as tanks, aircraft, capital ships etc. with no attempt to compare their relative effectiveness.
Far more sophisticated mathematical tools for analysis ranging from “Lanchester Square Equations,
Weapons Effectivity Indices, Weighted Unit Values,” and “Armored Division Equivalence” to the
currently classified U.S. Army method of comparing “Division Equivalent Firepower,” are available
and need to be employed in attempting any comprehensive analyses—certainly an analysis that
would guide policy makers. These analytical tools can be examined in the contexts of concepts
involving “force to force” and “force to space” ratios for given axes of potential attack and a fairly
accurate picture of both the likelihood of and the outcome of conflict can be generated.
This paper looks at the results of the relatively simplistic “bean count,” both in terms of general
but key economic indicators and in terms of conventional weapons systems, and it attempts to
draw some inferences about developments over the last decade and possible changes in the next
few years. Some implications in terms of nuclear deterrence will emerge but this subject needs
more detailed examination.
Section Three of this paper summarizes and provides a preliminary analysis of key economic
data presented more fully in Appendix One. Section Four looks at key military data, and offers a
preliminary judgment of the relative fighting capabilities (conventional) of the two countries.
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Ideally, the data on India should also be correlated with relevant information about Chinese
capabilities insofar as they impact on South Asia. Such an analysis has not been done in the present
paper in part because of complex methodological and data collection problems.
III
Key Economic Indicators
A variety of sources have been examined to collect data about five key economic indicators,
including gross national product (GNP), percentage of economy devoted to defense, debt, and
reserves (critical in terms of purchasing weapons and spares on the international market).
Additional indicators are presented in Appendix One.
Gross National Product/Gross Domestic Product
1985 1994 % change
India
GNP: ACDA ($ bill @ 94 prices) 185.7 287.1 154.6
IMF (Rs bill @ current) 2608.1 9310.2 357.0
GNP: IMF (Rs bill @ 90 prices) 3937.5 6252.2 156.8
IDSA(Rs bill @ current) 2622.4 9097.3 346.9
Pakistan
GNP: ACDA ($ bill @ 94 prices) 34.9 51.4 147.3
IMF (Pak Rs billion @ current) 510.5 1356.9 265.8
GDP: IMF (Pak Rs bill @ 90 prices) 645.9 1032.1 159.8
IDSA(Pak Rs bill @ current) 545.9 1677.0 307.2
Sources: World Military Expenditures; International Financial Statistics Yearbook; Asian Strategic Review.
Analysis. There is very little to choose between the two economies in terms of ‘real’ growth, and
inflation plays an important role in both. The Indian economy continues to be approximately 5.5
times the size of Pakistan’s over the decade in terms of U.S. dollars.
Defense Expenditure8
1985 1994 % change
India
ACDA ($ bill at 94 prices) 6.58 8.23 125.0
IDSA (Rs bill at current prices) 79.87 230.00 288.0
Pakistan
ACDA ($ bill at 94 prices) 2.17 3.07 141.5
IDSA (Pak Rs bill at current prices) 34.76 101.85 293.0
Sources: World Military Expenditure; Asian Strategic Review.
Analysis. Pakistani expenditures are growing slightly faster than India’s but the difference is not
significant.
                                                
8
 There is a degree of controversy in both India and Pakistan about accounting practices for defense expenditure. Needless to
say, there may be military-related expenditures in both countries which do not appear under this heading. However, while there
may be significant variations in the reliability of the data, over time the figures are reasonably accurate and comparable over
time.
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Defense Expenditure as % of GDP/GNP
1985 1994
India
ACDA (at constant 94 $ prices) 3.54 2.87
IDSA (at current Rs prices) 3.04 2.53
Pakistan
ACDA (at constant 94 $ prices) 6.22 5.97
IDSA (at current parks. prices) 6.37 6.07
Sources: World Military Expenditure; Asian Strategic Review.
Analysis. Contrary to widespread belief, there has been a drop in both Indian and Pakistani
expenditures relative to GDP/GNP.
Indebtedness
1985 1994 % change
India
Domestic debt (IMF Rs bill) 1083.6 4003.6 369.5
as % of GNP (IMF Rs) 41.5 50.9
Foreign debt (IMF Rs bill) 181.5 458.9 252.8
as % of GNP (IMF Rs) 7.0 5.8
Pakistan
Domestic debt (IMF Pak Rs bill) 143.9 612.6 425.7
as % of GNP (IMF Pak Rs) 28.2 45.1
Foreign debt (IMF Pak Rs bill) 140.2 446.0 318.1
as % of GNP (IMF Pak Rs) 27.5 32.9
Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook.
Analysis. Both countries are facing debt problems, and the Pakistan economy has become
significantly more debt dependent than India’s over the decade. Indian domestic debt, as a
percentage of GNP, has grown significantly but the foreign debt ratio has declined.
International Reserves (excluding gold)
1985 1993 % change
India
IBR&D ($ bill Free Foreign Exchange) 6.66 10.2 153.1
as % of Imports (IBR&D $) 42.00 44.7
Pakistan
(IBR&D) 0.81 1.2 148.1
as % of imports (IBR&D $) 29.60 12.6
Source: World Tables 1995.
Analysis. Pakistan is facing a severe Free Foreign Exchange (FFE) crunch while India seems to
have bounced back from the extreme vulnerability visible in 1990–91. Neither State is placed in a
position to spend considerably enhanced sums on weapons acquisitions without such a decision
severely impacting on the rest of the economy.
Summary
Even this cursory examination of a few salient economic indicators suggests that there is no
evidence of any dramatic increase in defense related expenditures, rather, both governments have
significantly cut back on military spending as a proportion of their respective GNPs/GDPs.
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IV
The Balance of ‘Conventional’ Military Strength
All data in this section is derived from recent issues of The Military Balance published by the
International Institute of Strategic Studies, London. While there may be differences between IISS
data and other publicly available sources, such differences tend to be relatively inconsequential.
Ground Forces
Manpower: (in thousands)
India
1988–89 1995–96
Army manpower
Army active 1200 980
Territorial Army 40 160
First line reserves 200 300
TOTAL 1440 1440
Para-military manpower
Army-type units—Ladakh Scouts 5 merged
—Rashtriya Rifles — 30
—Special Frontier Force 8 10
Border Guards—Bdr. Sec For (BSF) 90 185 a
—Assam Rifles 40 52
—Indo–Tibet Border Police (ITBP) 14 35
Anti Terrorist Special Forces—NSG 3 8
TOTAL 160 320
a
 extensively used-IS
Analysis. IISS estimates show a significant drop in “active” Indian army manpower over the
decade. However this has been offset in terms of numbers by large increases in reserves and in
“paramilitary” manpower reflecting the increasing emphasis on internal security problems. IISS
started assessing para-military manpower in 1988–89 so those figures are being used for
comparative purposes.
Pakistan
1988–89 1995–96
Army manpower
Army active 450 520
First line reserves 500 500
TOTAL 950 1020
Para-military manpower
Army-type units—National Guard 75 185
Border Guards—Frontier Corps 65 35
—Rangers 15 35
TOTAL 155 255
Analysis. There have been some increases both in ‘active’ army manpower and in ‘paramilitary’
forces.
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Formations
India
  3 x Armored Divisions
  4 x RAPID (reorganized Infantry Divisions)
15 x Infantry Divisions
  2 x Mountain Divisions
TOTAL 24 Divisions
Analysis. The present balance based on the IISS Military Balance estimates for 1995–96 indicate
India has a total of thirty-four divisions. Of these, seven mountain and one infantry divisions are
deployed in the Eastern Command on the Tibet–Burma–Bangladesh borders; at least one Mountain
Division is deployed on the Tibet border in the Central Command; and at least one Infantry
Division on the Tibet border in the Northern Command.
Thus, a total of twenty-four Divisions are available for deployment against Pakistan without
stripping the other borders.
3 x Indep Armored Brigades
6 x Indep Infantry Brigades
3 x Indep Artillery Brigade
1 x Special Forces Brigade equivalent.
13 x Indep Brigades approximately = 4 Division equivalents
Analysis. India is assessed to have seventeen Independent Brigades. IISS has not indicated any
deployment pattern for these, but assuming that two Armored, one Infantry and one Mountain are
reserved for deployment in Eastern and Central Commands, the remainder are deployable against
Pakistan. Thus, in total, India is assessed at having twenty-eight divisions deployable against
Pakistan with, perhaps, two more available at reasonably short notice by thinning out Eastern
Command.
Pakistan
Potential deployments against India will be as follows:
  2 x Armored Divisions
19 x Infantry Divisions
21 Divisions
Analysis. Pakistan is estimated to have a total of twenty-two divisions. No assessments as to
deployment are made by IISS, but, based on past patterns, at least one Infantry Division will be
deployed on the Afghanistan border compared to two during the Afghanistan crisis.
7 x Indep Armored Brigades
8 x Indep Infantry Brigades
1 x Special Forces equivalent
16 x Indep Brigades approximately = 5 Division equivalents
In addition, Pakistan is estimated to have eighteen Independent Brigades. Assuming that one
Independent Armored and one Independent Infantry are deployed on the Afghanistan border, the
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remainder are deployable against India. Thus, in total, Pakistan is assessed at having twenty-six
Divisions deployable against India with, perhaps, one more available at short notice.
In terms of fighting formations, taking note of India's borders with Tibet, Burma and
Bangladesh, prima facie, India would be able to deploy at most twenty-nine divisions and four
equivalents to Pakistan's twenty-one and five equivalents on their common borders. It is also
worth noting that India would have three Armored Divisions and one Armored Division equivalent
available to Pakistan's two Armored Divisions and two Armored Division equivalents.
Contrasting these figures with the situation in 1986–87, the comparative tables are as follows;
1986/87 1995/96
I. Total number of Divisions
India 32 34
Pakistan 19 22
Deployed on Other Borders
India 10 10
Pakistan 2 1
  Additional Division on Afghan Border 1
Deployable against Each Other
India 22 24
Pakistan 17 21
II. Total Independent Brigades
India 23 17
Pakistan 15 18
Deployed on Other Borders
India 4 4
Pakistan 4 2
  Brigades Positioned in Saudi Arabia 2
Deployable against Each Other
India 19 13
Pakistan 11 16
Division Equivalents a
India 6 4
Pakistan 3 5
Total Division and Division Equivalents a
India 27 + 6 = 33 29 + 4 = 33
Pakistan 18 + 3 = 21 21 + 5 = 26
a
 Division Equivalents are three independent brigades taken together
India appears to have rationalized command structures converting Independent Brigades to
Divisions.
Pakistan appears to have added to deployable forces through redeployments from the
Afghanistan border and Saudi Arabia. It appears, therefore, that the balance of formations has
altered slightly in Pakistan’s favor over the ten-year span.
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Major Platforms and Weapon Systems
Main Battle Tanks
India. IISS estimates India has 2400 main battle tanks deployed in its Armored and Infantry
formations. The bulk of the fleet is made up of T72/ M-1 tanks being manufactured locally under
license. These are gradually replacing the earlier T-55s and Vijayanta tanks some of which are
being upgraded. There is a marginal reduction in total numbers but not in fighting attributes over
the last decade and the figures are as follows:
1986/87 1995/96
Vijayanta 1250 800
T-55 1040 500
T72/M-1 350 1100
PT-76 (light tank) 150 —
TOTAL 2790 2400a
a
 excludes reserves
Pakistan. IISS estimates the Pakistan fleet at 2050 + main battle tanks. The bulk of the fleet
continues to consist of the Chinese Type 59 (a modified version of the T-55), but these are being
upgraded in fighting attributes. Newer Chinese tanks are being inducted gradually. There has been
a significant shift in the ratio of Pakistan to India main battle tanks in favor of Pakistan over the last
decade as follows:
1986/87 1995/96
M47 / M48 A 5 450 400
T 54 / T 55 50 50
Type 59 1100 1200 a
Type 69 — 200
Type 85 — > 200 b
TOTAL 1600 > 2050 b
a
 possibly being upgraded
b
 exact numbers not indicated
Infantry Combat Vehicles and Armored Personnel Carriers
India. India is estimated to be fielding 1057 infantry combat vehicles most of which are BMP 1/2,
the latter being manufactured locally under license. No quantification of BRDM recce vehicles has
been made by IISS. Overall numbers show a decline over the decade but the BMP-2s are a far
more efficient fighting machine than earlier models of armored personnel carriers.
1986/87 1995/96
BTR 60 360 —
OT 62/64 400 157
BMP 1/2 600 900
BRDM ? ?
TOTAL 1360 1057
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Pakistan. Pakistan is still reliant upon the M-113 which is locally produced under license. No
infantry combat vehicles have been procured.
1986/87 1995/96
UR 416 45 —
M 113 600 850
BTR 70 — 169 a
TOTAL 645 850 (+169)
a
 UNPROFOR
Self-Propelled Artillery
India. India has made no significant acquisitions of self-propelled systems in the decade.
1986/87 1995/96
105 mm Abbot 60 80
130 mm M46 (mod) 100 100
TOTAL 160 180
Pakistan. Pakistan has added significantly to its holdings of self-propelled artillery and has a
distinct edge over India both quantitatively and qualitatively.
1986/87 1995/96
105 mm M-7 12 50
155mm M109A2 100 150
203 mm M110 A2 40 40
TOTAL 152 240
Tube Artillery
India. Although numbers have not altered significantly over the decade, there has been a marked
improvement in terms of modernization. The old workhorses (25 pounder, 5.5 inch, and 100 mm)
have been replaced by 105s, 122 mm, 130 mm, and 155mm. India continues to have a significant
edge in tube artillery capability.
1986/87 1995/96
75 /24 mtn gun 850 900
76 M-48 (Yug) 200 215
25 pounder 800 —
100 mm (1944) 185 —
105 M-56 800 50
105 Ind Fld Gun I/II 280 1200
122 mm D-30 — 550
130 mm M-46 400 750
5.5 inch 140 —
155 mm FH 77 B — 410
TOTAL 3655 4075
Pakistan. A similar situation obtains with reference to Pakistan’s holdings; no major change in
numbers but meaningful modernization again replacing 25 pounders and 5.5 inch with more
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modern systems chiefly of Chinese origin. IISS data for Pakistan was less specific in earlier
assessments as follows:
1986/87 1995/96
85 mm 180 200
25 pounder 1000 —
100 mm some —
105 M-101 — 300
105 M56 pack — 50
122 mm T 60 — 200
122 mm T 54 — 400
130 mm T59-1 100 200
155 mm M59 — 30
155 mm M 114 40 60
155 mm M198 75 100
203 mm M 115 — 26
5.5 inch some —
TOTAL 1395 + 1566
Other Artillery Systems
India. India has a significant lead in heavy mortar and MLRS capabilities. IISS reporting on
MLRS has significant discrepancies as to quality relative to “Jane’s” assessments. Jane’s
concludes that India has improved upon the Soviet MLRS (BM-21) originally purchased and has
also developed its own longer range system indigenously. These developments do not feature in
IISS data which show a drop in India’s MLRS holdings:
1986/87 1995/96
120 mm mortars 500 1000
160 mm mortars 50 200
122 mm BM – 21 MLRS 120 80
Pakistan. A similar comment applies to IISS assessments of Pakistan’s holdings and capability in
terms of modernization. IISS estimates are:
1986/87 1995/96
120 mm AM – 50 /M61 — 225
122 mm BM – 11 MLRS some 45
Surface to Surface Ballistic Missiles
India. IISS estimates that India has deployed some three to five launchers but have not
commented on the numbers of missiles available. Earlier they had estimated a total of fifteen
missiles. These missiles, the Prithvi, have been developed indigenously. They are short range
(150–200 km) and are capable of carrying a 1-ton payload.
Pakistan. IISS estimate that Pakistan has deployed some eighteen Hatf-1 and ‘some’  Hatf-2
missiles. These are said to be indigenous developments of meteorological sounding rockets. No
assessments of possible acquisition or deployment of Chinese made M-11 missiles have been
made.
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Anti-Tank Guided Weapons
Indian holdings include the Milan and the AT3, AT4 and AT5 of Soviet origin. Pakistan holdings
include the Cobra and TOW from the United States and the Chinese ‘Red Arrow.’
Army Surface to Air Missiles
India carries approximately 1500 missiles of Soviet origin including SAM 6, 7, 8A/B, 9, 13 and
16. Some of these are vehicle mounted and others are shoulder fired. Pakistan holds some 350
Redeye / Stinger / RBS-70 and 500 Chinese Anza 1/2 missiles.
Summary—Ground Forces
There is evidence to show both India and Pakistan are gradually modernizing their major weapon
platforms and systems. Progress is slow and dependence on old technologies is still at a high level.
Neither side has made any very significant acquisitions in quantitative terms during the last decade
and the “numbers ratios” have moved marginally in favor of Pakistan. The sole exception to this
broad analysis are surface to surface ballistic missiles. These “dual capable “systems did not exist
on the sub-continent a decade ago and are obviously being treated as high priority development
objectives by both countries. They are also seen as high visibility deployments capable of altering
the “correlation of forces” in potentially nuclear terms and therefore to be treated differently to, say,
main battle tanks. Missiles of this genre, being “dual capable,” also attract the attention of the
international nonproliferation community and consequently are of significant global interest.
Air Forces
Major Platforms/Weapon Systems
Ground Attack Aircraft
India. IISS estimates suggest India has improved her ground attack fleet considerably, both
quantitatively and qualitatively. Some old aircraft types have been deleted from the inventory and
replaced by more modern and effective platforms such as the MiG-27 being built indigenously
under license. This aircraft will become the mainstay of the Indian fleet in the years ahead as it
gradually replaces the MiG-21s in service. India appears to have a significant and increasing edge
over Pakistan in this category. Comparative figures are as follows:
1986/87 1995/96
Ajeet 72 —
BaE Canberra 23 —
HAL Marut 18 —
MiG-21 MF/PFMA some (59) 144
Jaguar 1 S 68 97
MiG-23 BN/  72 54
MiG-27 24 148
TOTAL 337 ? 443
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Pakistan. No major acquisitions/changes have taken place in the Pakistani fleet:
1986/87 1995/96
Mirage III 17 18
Mirage 5  50 56
A-5 Fantan 41 49
TOTAL 108 125
Fighter Aircraft
India. There has been some change in Indian holdings over the decade. The fleet is still heavily
dependent on the MiG-21 series, particularly the Bis, and there have been no new acquisitions
since 87–88 when the MiG-29s were inducted.
1986/87 1995/96
MiG-21 FL/U 74
MiG-21 Bis 200 170
MiG-23 MF/UM 45 26
Mirage 2000 H/TH 24 35
MiG-29 — 67
TOTAL 269 372
Pakistan. Pakistan has acquired some newer aircraft in the shape of Chinese F 7P s and Mirage
III Os replacing older F 6s. Overall numbers have moved upwards similar to Indian changes.
1986/87 1995/96
F 6/ FT 6 170 100
F 16 A/B 30 34  
F 7 P — 79
Mirage III O — 30
TOTAL 200 243
Other Platforms
The one significant change is that IISS estimate India has modified three Canberras for the ECM
role; two Boeing 707s in the Elint role and is testing two Avro HS 748s in the AWACS role.
‘Traditional’ recce capabilities on both sides have not altered significantly from earlier levels.
Air launched Air to Air Missiles
India has a large spread of Soviet and French missiles spanning the spectrum from close combat to
‘beyond visual range’. These include the AA 2, 7, 8, 10, 11 and the R-530 D and 550. Pakistan’s
holdings include the AIM-7 , AIM-9 , R 530 and R 550.
Air Force SAMs
India’s holdings include the SAM 2, 3, and 5. Pakistan holds the Chinese version of the SAM 2
and the French Crotale.
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Air to Surface Missiles
The Indian Air Force has the AS 7 , 11B , 12 and 30 against land based targets and the Sea Eagle
in the anti-shipping role. Pakistan holds the Exocet for shipping targets.
Summary
Indian air power has acquired a distinct edge in terms of ground attack capabilities and seems to be
moving towards the deployment of electronic warfare platforms which could further enhance
ground attack. Pakistan appears to be concentrating its investments in air defense aircraft
presumably to offset the Indian edge.
Naval Forces
Major Platforms and Weapon Systems
Submarines
India. The Indian submarine fleet has undergone significant modernization over the last decade
with Soviet Kilos and German Type 209s replacing the earlier Foxtrots. Overall numbers have
almost doubled and are considerably higher than Pakistan’s.
1986/87 1995/96
Foxtrot 8 4
Kilo — 8
T-209/ 1500  — 3
TOTAL 8 15
Pakistan. There has been no change in Pakistan’s capability which remains:
1986/87 1995/96
Agosta 2 2
Daphne 4 4
TOTAL 6 6
Midgets 5 3
Principal Surface Combatants
India. Quantitatively, there has been no increase in the Indian fleet, but qualitatively, considerable
upgradation has taken place over the decade. Most of this happened seven to eight years ago, after
which there has been little change.
1986/87 1995/96
Aircraft Carriers 1 2
Destroyers 3 5
Frigates 21 18 a
TOTAL 25 25
a
 excluding reserves
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Pakistan. There have been significant additions to Pakistan’s frigate holdings but large reductions
in destroyers. The fleet is not comparable to India’s in terms of surface to surface and surface to air
capabilities.
1986/87 1995/96
Destroyers 7 3
Frigates — 8
TOTAL 7 11
Coastal Combatants
India. There has been a substantial increase in India’s corvette holdings and newer Soviet types
have been inducted and are being built indigenously. These have offset drops in Missile boat
numbers. Mine warfare capabilities have not altered.
1986/87 1995/96
Corvettes 4 17
Missile craft 14 6
Mine warfare 18 20
Pakistan. No change
1995/96 1986/87
Missile craft 8 8
Mine warfare 3 3
Maritime and Naval Air Power
India. Indian capabilities have increased significantly both in numbers and in quality. The
induction of a second carrier led to a major increase in ship borne attack; all new destroyers/frigates
carry anti-submarine helicopters; new types of land based recce/ASW Tu-142 M and Il-38s were
bought from the Soviets and coastal recce has been improved with Dorniers.
1986/87 1995/96
Land based strike-Canberra 12 —
-Jaguar — 6
Ship borne attack-Sea Harrier 8 20
Armed Rotary wing 25 75
Anti submarine/ maritime recce 15 46
Pakistan. There has been very little change in holdings which do not compare with India’s.
1986/87 1995/96
Fixed wing Mar recce/stand off strike 3 4
Armed rotary wing 10 13
Naval Surface to Surface Missiles
India. Of the total of forty-eight destroyers, frigates, corvettes and missile craft , thirty-two are
equipped with the Styx missile in two variants. All new craft being built are similarly equipped.
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Pakistan. The Pakistan Navy has a total of eleven missile equipped vessels; three destroyers
carrying the Harpoon, and six missile craft with the Chinese HY-2. However, Pakistan also has
six submarines with the ‘under sea’ launched Harpoon.
Naval SAMs
India has five destroyers and three frigates that are equipped with integral SAMs.
Summary: Naval Forces
The Indian Navy was substantively enhanced in every respect towards the end of the 1980s and
early 1990s. This has created a significant edge over Pakistan where the Navy has barely altered
over the decade. However, Indian naval expansion has slowed down materially in the last five
years particularly in terms of its “blue water” capabilities.
V
Summary Of Key Findings
Both India and Pakistan have reduced the proportion of GNP/GDP spent on defense over the
decade under review, and both economies have been able, thereby, to spend more on other sectors.
Pakistan’s economy has become more vulnerable to problems arising out of domestic and
international indebtedness and to shortages in free foreign exchange reserves.
There is some evidence to show that both countries are modernizing weapons systems,
although the rate of progress is very slow. Neither side has made any significant acquisitions of
newer equipment, and India’s traditional quantitative superiority is gradually reversing. The only
really significant potential induction is short range surface to surface “dual capable” ballistic
missiles on both sides. So far these do not appear to have been deployed.
India seems to have acquired a distinct edge in ground attack capabilities and seems to be
moving towards the deployment of EW capabilities which could further enhance this “edge”.
Pakistan seems to be concentrating on air defense aircraft presumably to counteract these changes.
The Indian Navy seemed to be moving towards significant expansion in all respects in the mid-
1980s, and that gave it a distinct edge over Pakistan where the navy has barely altered over the
decade. However, much seems to have changed in Indian expansion during the1990s, and the
emphasis on “brown water” assets seems to have increased at the cost of “blue water” capabilities.
The trends suggested by the economic and the military indicators that we have used—and
which come from completely different sources—all point in the same direction, a reduction in
military preparedness on both sides. There is a visible downsizing in weapons holdings in many
major systems although clearly there are gaps in IISS data based on some of the unexplained year
to year fluctuations in their assessments. India is also downsizing army manpower in favor of
enhanced “internal security” forces to tackle domestic problems. Some commentators believe that
these paramilitary or armed police forces should be included as part of army estimates, but I do not
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agree, taking into account the differences in training, command and control, leadership, equipment
holdings, deployability, and mission profiles.
Given the above, one must conclude that there is a reduction in conventional military
preparedness on both sides in 1994 relative to 1985. This could be the consequence of a variety of
factors impacting jointly or severally to create this result. Some of the alternative explanations that
require examination are:
a) There has been a significant reduction in tensions between the two states and,
consequently, both governments feel secure in reducing defense expenditures and using the
resultant savings in more socially relevant areas.
b) The two economies are facing severe crisis sufficient to ensure that finance for defense
expenditures are not available even if the governments wanted to undertake such expenditures.
c) The downsizing in weapons holdings is a function of increased unit costs for the more
modern weapons compared to their predecessors. Effectivity has been enhanced through
modernization even if numbers have dropped.
d) There is a popular movement against defense expenditure in both countries at the cost of
other “productive” spending and the two democratically elected governments are responding to
this popular opinion.
e) Some new factors have come into play in both states, after 1985 and before 1994, which
have impacted on defense expenditures as reported.
These propositions will be further examined in Section VI with the objective of assessing their
value in accounting for the reductions in conventional military preparedness, particularly in the case
of India.
VI
Alternative Explanations
There is some evidence to suggest that relations between India and Pakistan in the period 1987 to
1994 were at the lowest possible level short of war. India was consistently accusing Pakistan of
supporting terrorism and secession in both Punjab and Kashmir and Pakistan was countering by
accusing India of aiding the “Muhajirs” in Sindh. Some commentators in the region and outside
believe that the two countries came close to outright military conflict both in 1987 (as a
consequence of the Indian “Brass Tacks” exercises) and in 1990 (following a rapid escalation in
Low Intensity Conflict Operations in Kashmir). The period from 1990 to 1994 saw significant
intensification in the Kashmir conflicts between Indian security forces and insurgents said to be
trained and armed by Pakistan.
Given this background it seems fair to say that this environment was clearly not conducive to
the reduction in defense preparedness that was being implemented by both governments. If
anything, such an escalation in the potential for military conflict over specific and tangible issues
between the two states should logically have led to a visible increase in military expenditures.
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The Indian economy seems markedly stronger than it was a decade ago and “real” growth
rates, while lower than required, have been consistent. There is absolutely no evidence to suggest
that successive Indian Governments have cut back on defense expenditures specifically as a
consequence of economic compulsions. In fact, it would probably be correct to assume that India
was relatively better placed to afford enhanced expenditures on military preparedness had
successive governments, at any time during the period, believed such expenditures to be essential
for national security.
While there has been some modernization in both armed forces, the “newer” weapons systems
are still over twenty-years old. There is no evidence of the introduction of either the most modern
technologies or of force multipliers adequate to justify a decline in numbers of weapons deployed.
The modernization undertaken by either state has not been adequate to explain the reductions in
either numbers or expenditures.
While there has been some criticism of “wasteful” expenditure on defense, particularly in India,
there can be no suggestion that there has been an outcry within the voting population sufficient to
cause elected politicians to cut back on expenditures. If anything, I would hazard a guess that
“jingoistic” statements by Indian politicians “blaming” Pakistan for a variety of Indian problems
has been at its peak since the early 1990s. The drop in defense expenditure ratios in India runs
counter to this increase in the level of rhetoric which, paradoxically, could well have been used to
justify an increase in such expenditures.
Clearly, none of the alternatives examined above are adequate to explain the obvious disparity
between inter-state relations, on the one hand, which have reached a decided low ebb in the latter
part of the decade under review and the reductions in defense expenditure as a proportion of
GDP/GNP in India on the other. There are, therefore, two possible explanations for this state of
affairs relating to “new” elements in the equation:
One, the Indian Government has decided that war with Pakistan is no longer likely and,
therefore, major investments in the Indian military are no longer required. This could be a result of
the following “calculations”:
(a) Pakistan does not have the capability to launch such a war
(and/or)
(b) India has no intention to initiate a war and, therefore, war cannot occur
(and/or)
(c) The international community will not tolerate such a war
(and/or)
(d) “Costs”, will exceed any possible “benefits” of such a war.
While it is possible that one or more of these alternatives are considered possible or even
probable, it is equally certain that the postures adopted by the two states towards each other do not
exhibit any corresponding degree of optimism. Therefore, it is difficult to believe that the Indian
government has decided to implement vital decisions regarding defense expenditures solely on the
basis of an optimistic review of the likelihood of war in the future.
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The second possibility is that the Indian government, and to a lesser degree their Pakistani
counterparts, are convinced conventional war is a thing of the past because of the ground realities
resulting from the existence of nuclear weapons on both sides.
India could believe that it has no compelling reason to attack Pakistan conventionally other than
to relieve pressure on Kashmir. Such an attack in a nuclear environment could provide the trigger
for escalation to nuclear war given that the attack could fuel Pakistan fears of potential defeat at the
hands of a larger and better armed state. The nuclearization of the conflict would defeat the original
objective of relieving pressure at minimal cost and, thus, render the option invalid. India could also
believe that Pakistan would be deterred from attacking India conventionally by the possibility of
Indian nuclear escalation and, in any event, the “defender” enjoys a definite advantage in terms of
the requirement of men and materiel to defeat a conventional attack even using only conventional
means.
Pakistan, equally, could believe that the possession of a nuclear weapons capability deters
India from mounting a conventional assault, and an Indian nuclear capability would similarly deter
Pakistan. Pakistan could also believe that reductions in Indian conventional capabilities were an
adequate prerequisite for similar declines in Pakistani outlays.
If both sides concluded that (a) conventional war would automatically result in nuclear
escalation; (b) that both sides were de facto nuclear weapons states and therefore such escalation
would result in nuclear war; and (c) that such escalation would be an unacceptable price to pay,
then both would have no real incentive to enhance conventional military preparedness.
As stated in the opening paragraphs of this paper, I have not examined the viability of this
explanation in terms of fissile material holdings, nuclear weapons launch capabilities, or
expenditures in areas related to nuclear weaponization. Therefore, this paper will not discuss the
specifics about the validity of nuclear deterrence as an explanation of the reductions in conventional
defense expenditure ratios. All I am prepared to say is that this line of argument seems to provide a
more convincing explanation of the apparent downsizing than the other alternatives examined
earlier in this paper.
VII
Conclusions9
Contrary to popular belief, there is no evidence of any increase in defense spending ratios in
either India or Pakistan over the last ten years. In fact, both countries have reduced the ratios of
such expenditures relative to their national economies.
There is also no evidence of any significant aggregation in weapons systems deployed by either
country in any of the three sectors— ground, air, or sea.
                                                
9
 These conclusions will not be vitiated by recent reports of agreements/contracts for conventional weapons systems
acquisitions by both countries since the bulk of these acquisitions seem to be in the nature of replacements for existing systems
that will require phasing out in the near future.
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A prima facie evaluation of possible causes for this situation suggests that a unique form of
nuclear deterrence, not related to overt weaponization, may have come into play and this has given
successive governments in both countries the confidence to reduce proportional spending on
conventional military capabilities during a period of a significant worsening of relations between
the two countries. This hypothesis needs more exacting and detailed examination.
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Appendix One
Economic Data
TABLE A1.1 Economic Data for India and Pakistan: 1986 to 1994
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
India
GNP at current prices $ bill 149.40 161.50 184.40 205.00 225.90 235.10 253.10 267.10 287.10
GNP at constant 1994 prices 194.20 203.50 223.80 238.10 251.50 252.00 263.90 272.60 287.10
Mil expend at current prices $ bill 5.37 5.81 6.23 6.50 6.55 6.30 6.38 7.43 8.23
Mil expend at constant 1994 prices 6.98 7.33 7.56 7.55 7.29 6.75 6.66 7.58 8.23
Cent Govt expend at 1994 prices 46.63 47.15 50.47 55.14 55.36 52.33 53.81 58.59 56.60
Mil expend as % GNP 1994 prices 3.60 3.60 3.40 3.20 2.90 2.70 2.50 2.80 2.90
CGE as % GNP at 1994 prices 24.00 23.20 22.60 23.20 22.00 20.80 20.40 21.50 19.70
Mil expend as % CGE at 1994 prices 15.00 15.50 15.00 13.70 13.20 12.90 12.40 12.90 14.50
Pakistan
GNP at current prices $ bill 28.40 30.63 33.61 36.57 39.88 42.94 47.14 48.97 51.41
GNP at constant 1994 prices $ bill 36.93 38.60 40.79 42.46 44.39 46.02 49.16 49.98 51.41
Mil expend at current prices $ bill 1.82 2.23 2.33 2.34 2.77 2.61 2.92 3.17 3.07
Mil expend at constant 1993 prices $ bill 2.37 2.81 2.83 2.72 3.08 2.80 3.04 3.23 3.07
CGE at constant 1994 prices $ bill 9.38 9.58 9.71 11.08 10.80 11.38 12.83 13.12 13.33
Mil exp as % GNP (constant price) 6.40 7.30 6.90 6.40 6.90 6.10 6.20 6.50 6.00
CGE as % GNP (constant price) 25.40 24.80 23.80 26.10 24.30 24.70 26.10 26.30 25.90
Mil exp as % CGE (constant price) 25.20 29.30 29.20 24.50 28.50 24.60 23.70 24.70 23.00
Source: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures, 1995
TABLE A1.2 Asian Development Bank Data ($ bill)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
India
Int LT debt 17.94 21.70 26.31 30.12 33.69 27.02
Int ST debt 2 25 2.50 2.87 2.96 3.93 4.00
Debt repay 2.29 1.89 1.95 1.98 2.41 3.68
Tot ext debt 48.35 55.82 58.47 63.93 69.14 71.56
FFE Res 5.44 5.60 4.15 3.11 1.20 3.58 5.46 9.81 23.05
Pakistan
Int LT debt 3.54 3.95 4.37 4.46 5.10 5.76
Int ST debt 1.29 1.47 1.90 2.33 2.54 3.23
Debt repay 0.69 0.76 0.85 0.80 0.90 0.95
Tot ext debt 14.89 16.69 16.96 18.30 20.06 22.97
FFE Reserve 0.70 0.49 0.39 0.52 0.30 0.52 0.85 1.20 2.93
Source: Asian Development Bank, Key Indicator of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries .
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TABLE A1.3 Asian Development Bank Data
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
India
Nat gas Petjls 146.00 210.00 235.00 260.00 316.00 388.00 397.00 520.00
Coal/Lig Mmt 157.48 170.46 185.35 197.56 208.56 211.39 224.5 250.12
Elec prd Bkwh 183.39 201.28 218.98 241.31 268.66 289.44 313.04 327.91
Crude prd Mmt 29.86 31.16 30.14 31.58 33.69 33.31 31.01 27.39
Pakistan
Nat gas Petjls 315.00 330.00 341.00 371.00 386.00 423.00 440.00 543.00 575.00
Coal/lig Mmt 2.20 2.26 2.75 2.64 3.14 3.05 3.19
Elec prd Bkwh 30.17 33.48 38.62 40.28 43.88 47.33 51.97
Crude prd Mmt 1.28 1.93 2.01 2.19 2.29 2.62 3.15 3.72
Source: Asian Development Bank, Key Indicator of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries .
TABLE A1.4 International Bank of Reconstruction & Development Data
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
India
GNP Rs bill 2603.40 2903.30 3299.90 3917.70 4510.40 5253.00 6047.80 6947.40 7745.80
Exports $ bill 8.75 9.19 11.60 13.18 15.84 17.72 17.48 19.56 21.55
Imports $ bill 15.86 15.09 16.75 18.96 20.26 23.30 20.30 23.58 22.76
Ext debt $ bill 40.97 48.28 55.73 58.44 73.39 81.99 83.95 90.13 91.78
long term 36.61 43.33 50.05 52.09 65.89 73.45 76.88 83.79 88.16
short term 4.36 4.95 5.68 6.35 7.50 8.54 7.07 6.34 3.62
Intl Reserves (excld gold) 6.66 6.73 6.39 4.96 4.11 1.52 3.63 5.76 10.20
Pakistan
GNP Pak Rs bill 510.50 555.90 608.90 704.50 797.80 892.90 1044.50 1223.90 1357.00
Exports $ bill 2.74 3.38 4.18 4.53 4.78 5.52 6.46 7.27 6.64
Imports $ bill 5.89 5.38 5.83 6.62 7.12 7.36 8.46 9.37 9.50
Ext debt $ bill 13.37 14.87 16.67 16.91 18.26 20.57 22.96 24.10 26.05
long term 12.06 13.00 14.39 14.48 15.49 17.38 18.80 19.70 21.55
short term 1.31 1.87 2.28 2.43 2.77 3.19 4.16 4.40 4.50
Intl Reserve (excld gold) 0.81 0.71 0.50 0.39 0.52 0.30 0.53 0.85 1.20
Source: International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, World Tables 1995.
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TABLE A1.5 Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis Data
1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96
India
GDP Rs bill 2622.43 2929.49 3332.01 3957.79 4568.3 5320.30 6156.55 7056.00 8856.20 9097.25 10443.00
CGE Rs bill 531.12 640.23 703.05 814.02 950.49 1040.73 1127.31 1277.53 1380.28 1516.99
Def exp Rs bill 79.87 104.77 119.67 133.41 145.00 154.26 163.47 175.82 215.00 230.00 255.00
CGE as % of
GDP
20.30 21.90 21.10 20.60 20.80 17.60 18.30 18.10 15.60 16.70
DE as % of GDP 3.05 3.58 3.59 3.37 3.17 2.90 2.65 2.49 2.68 2.53 2.39
DE as % of CGE 15.04 16.37 17.02 16.39 15.26 14.69 14.50 13.76 15.58 15.15
Pakistan
GDP Pak Rs bill 545.89 618.04 596.30 759.35 887.81 992.66 1211.30 1359.30 1481.30 1677.00
CGE Pak Rs bill 100.04 111.86 136.15 156.42 173.27 183.66 199.00 235.00 258.00 295.02 334.74
Def Exp P Rs bn 34.76 41.33 47.02 51.05 57.93 63.60 76.96 89.11 91.10 101.85 115.25
CGE as % of
GDP
18.30 18.10 22.80 20.60 19.50 18.50 16.40 17.30 17.40 17.60
DE as % of GDP 7.10 7.57 7.61 8.56 7.62 7.16 7.74 7.70 6.96 6.88 6.88
DE as % of CGE 34.75 36.94 34.53 32.64 33.43 34.63 38.67 37.91 34.31 34.52 34.43
Source: Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, Asian Strategic Review .
TABLE A1.6 International Monetary Fund data
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
India
GDP Rs bill 2622.40 2929.50 3332.00 3957.80 4568.20 5355.30 6168.00 7053.30 8010.30 9456.20
GDP Rs bill 90 3937.50 4129.10 4326.20 4755.50 5068.00 5355.30 5381.40 5629.20 5881.60 6252.20
GNP Rs bill 2608.10 2911.40 3305.80 3912.90 4510.90 5279.70 6059.80 6910.30 7864.30 9310.20
Dom debt Rs bl 1083.60 1315.40 1532.90 1830.40 2202.60 2610.40 2942.50 3359.00 4003.60 4558.90
Intl debt Rs bl 181.50 203.00 232.20 257.50 283.40 315.30 369.50 422.70 458.90 495.10
Total Debt 1185.10 1518.40 1765.10 2087.90 2286.00 2925.70 3312.00 3781.70 4462.50 5054.00
Exports Rs bl 149.50 165.40 202.80 259.10 346.10 406.40 562.50 673.10
Imports Rs bl 217.50 223.60 252.60 320.10 402.10 487.00 562.50 730.00
Exports $ bill 9.47 10.25 11.88 13.51 16.14 18.29 18.10 20.02
Imports $ bill 15.08 15.69 17.66 20.09 22.25 23.44 21.09 22.15
Pakistan
GDP P Rs bill 472.46 514.53 572.48 675.39 769.75 855.94 1020.60 1211.38 1341.95 1564.97
GDP P Rs bl 90 645.88 681.41 725.38 780.69 819.41 855.94 902.70 973.35 992.03 1032.13
GNP P Rs bill 510.47 555.89 608.86 704.48 797.80 892.84 1044.51 1223.92 1356.89 1579.77
Dom debt P Rs bl 143.93 193.39 225.25 284.49 327.53 376.60 441.58 527.60 612.64
Intl debt P Rs bl 140.16 167.00 187.03 207.74 253.66 297.65 335.00 375.23 446.04
Total debt 284.09 360.39 412.28 492.23 581.19 674.25 776.58 902.83 1058.68
Exports P Rs bl 49.89 63.27 79.06 93.60 108.32 126.58 172.81 209.22 217.42 245.86
Imports P Rs bl 106.73 103.48 109.27 131.20 156.64 173.29 188.68 247.41 296.05 313.30
Exports $bill 2.65 3.19 3.94 4.41 4.80 5.38 6.38 6.88 6.76
Imports $bill 5.88 5.97 6.25 7.10 7.37 8.09 8.64 9.67 9.31
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook.
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TABLE A1.7 United Nations Statistical Yearbook data
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Agriculture
India
Cereals Millmt 165.0 156.1 183.9 199.4 193.9 191.6 201.7 201.5
Ed oil seed Mmt 4.8 4.9 6.9 7.2 7.2 7.4 8.5 8.2
Sugar Mmt 7.6 9.2 10.2 9.9 12.1 13.1 13.9 11.8
Pakistan
Cereals Mmt 20.9 18.5 19.2 21.0 21.0 21.1 22.1 23.8
Ed oil seed Mmt 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.6
Sugar Mmt 1.2 1.4 1.9 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.6 2.8
Industry
India
Fertilrs Mmt 9.1 9.9 9.8 11.1 11.6 12.6 12.8 12.2
Cement Mmt 35.0 37.1 41.1 44.2 46.2 51.7 53.7
Cott fab Mmsq 12.6 12.4 12.9 12.3 12.5 16.2 15.3 16.4
Pakistan
Ferts Mmt 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.8 2.1
Cement Mmt 5.8 6.5 7.1 7.1 7.5 7.8 8.3
Cott fab Mmsq 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Source: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook .
TABLE A1.8 United Nations Statistical Yearbook data
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
India
Imports $ bill 15.40 16.70 19.10 20.60 23.60 20.40 23.60 22.80
Exports $ bill 9.40 11.30 13.20 15.90 18.00 17.70 19.60 21.60
FFE res $ bill 5.44 5.60 4.15 3.11 1.21 3.58 5.46 9.81 23.10
Exch rate US$ 12.60 13.00 13.90 16.20 17.50 22.70 25.90 30.50 31.40
Pakistan
Imports $ bill 5.40 5.80 6.60 7.10 7.40 8.50 9.40 9.50
Exports $ bill 3.40 4.20 4.50 4.80 5.50 6.50 7.30 6.70
FFE res $ bill 0.70 0.49 0.39 0.52 0.85 1.20 2.93
Exch rate US $ 16.60 17.40 18.00 20.50 21.70 23.80 25.10 28.10 30.60
Source: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook .
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Appendix Two: Military Data
TABLE A2.1 IISS: Ground Forces Manpower
1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96
India
Active Regular 1100 1100 1200 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 980
Terr Army 40 40 40 160 160 160 160 160 160 160
1 st L ine Reserve 200 200 200 300 300 300 300 300 300 300
Ladakh Scouts 5 5 5 5 5 5 30
Rashtriya Rifles
SFF 8 8 8 10 10 10 10 10
BSF 90 90 90 140 171 171 120 185
Assam Rifles 40 40 40 15 35 35 29 52
ITBP 14 14 14 22 29 29 29 35
NSG 3 5 5 5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5
Pakistan
Active Regular 450 450 450 480 500 500+ 515 510 520 520
1 st L ine Reserve 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 300 300 500
National Guard 75 75 150 150 180 185 185 185
Front Corps 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 35
Rangers 15 15 16 23 23 23 25 35
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance .
TABLE A2.2 IISS: Ground Forces Formations
1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96
India
CORPS HQ 8 9 10 10 10 10 11 11 12 12
Divisions
Armored 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
Mechanised 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Infantry 22 20 20 19 19 21 22 22 22 17
Rapid 4
Mountain 7 9 11 11 11 11 10 10 10 10
Independent Brigades
Armored 7 7 8 5 5 8 5 5 5 5
Infantry 10 10 7 7 7 9 7 7 7 7
Mountain 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Artillery 4 10 3 3 3 5 3 3 3 3
Speci al Fo rces 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Pakistan
CORPS HQ 7 7 7 7 9 9 9 9 9 9
Divisions
Armored 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Infantry 17 17 17 14 19 20 20 20 20 20
Independent Brigades
Armored a 6 6 6 7 9 7 7 7 8 8
Infantry 8 8 8 4 4 6 8 9 9 9
Speci al Fo rces 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance
Notes: a including RECCE
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TABLE A2.3 IISS: Ground Forces Platforms/Systems
1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96
MBTs
India (excluding reserves)
T-55 1040 800 800 800 800 500 800 800 800 500
Vijayanta 1250 1500 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1200 1200 800
T 72/ M-1 350 350 650 650 700 900 1300 1400 1400 1100
PT-76 (light) 150 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Total 2790 2750 3250 3250 3300 3200 3900 3500 3400 2400
Pakistan (excluding reserves)
M-47 150 150 120 120 120
M-48 A 5 450 450 450 500 500 280 280 280 280 280
T 54/55 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Type 59 1100 1100 1100 1200 1300 1300 1300 1200 1200 1200
Type 69 ? 200 200 200 200 200
Type-85 ? 40 >100 >200
Total 1600 1600 1600 1750 >1850 1980 >1980 1890 >1950 >2050
AFVs /IPCs
India
BTR-60 360 360 50 50 50 50 50
OT 62/64 400 350 400 400 400 400 400 400 157 157
BMP 1/2 600 600 700 700 800 800 800 900 900 900
BRDM Held: numbers not indicated
Total 1360 1310 1150 1150 1250 1250 1250 1300 1057 1057
Pakistan
Ur-416 45 45
M-113 600 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 820 850
BTR-70 169  UNPROFOR
Total 645 845 800 800 800 800 800 800 820 1019
S.P. Arty
India
105 mm Abbot 60 60 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
130mm M-46 100 100 50 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Total 160 160 130 180 180 180 180 180 180 180
Pakistan
105mm M-7 12 12 12 12 50 50 50 50 50 50
155mm M 109A2 100 64 64 95 125 125 150 150 150 150
203mm M 110 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
Total 152 116 116 147 215 215 240 240 240 240
Towed Artillery
India
75/75-24 850 850 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900
76mm M 48 200 200 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215
25 pdr 800 800 1000 1000 1000 1000
100mm M 1944 185 185 185 185 185 185 185
105 IFG I/II 280 280 30 30 30 100 100 1200 1200 1200
105 M 56 800 860 800 800 800 800 800 50 50 50
122mm D 30 ? 550
130mm M-46 400 400 550 550 550 550 550 550 550 750
5.5 inch 140 140 150 150 150 150
155 FH 77B some 30 50 410 410 410 410 410 410
Total 3655 >3715 3860 3850 3860 4000 3160 3325 3325 4075
Pakistan
85mm T 56 180 180 ? ? ? 200 200 200 200 200
25 pdr 1000 1000 ? ? ? 200 200 200
(continues )
Appendix Two—27
TABLE A2.3 (continued)
1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96
Towed Artillery
Pakistan
105 M-101 200 200 250 300 300 300 300 300
100mm T 59 ? ? ? ?
105 M 56 pack 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
122 T 60 200 200 200 200 200
122 T 54 100 100 400 ? ? 400 400 400
130 T-59-1 100 ? ? ? 200 200 200 200 200 200
155 M 59 ? ? ? 85 30 30 30 30 30
155 M 114 40 60 60 60 100 60 60 60 60 60
155 M 198 75 95 95 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
203 M 115 20 20 20 26 26
5.5 inch ? ? ? ? 45 45 45 45
Total 1395+ 1335+ 455+ 510+ 1230+ 1405+ 1405+ 1805 1566 1566
Multiple Rocket Launcher System
India
122 BM 21 120 120 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
Pakistan
122 BM 11/83 ? ? ? ? ? 36 45 45 45 45
Surface to Surface Missiles
India
Prithvi
Pakistan
Hatf-1 ? ? ? 18 18 18 18
Hatf-2 ? ? ? ? ?
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance
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TABLE A2.4 IISS: Air Platforms and Systems
1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96
Ground Attack
India
HF 24 Marut 18     ? 20 20 20
Ajeet 72 72 80 80 48
MiG 21 MF 59? 60 90 120 108 112 112 144 144 144
Jaguar 68 79 72 70 80 80 80 80 89 97
MiG 23 BN 72 95 90 60 64 54 54 54 54 54
MiG 27 24 24 72 72 80 56 100 96 120 148
Canberra 23 23 10 10
Total 337+ 353+ 434 432 400 302 346 374 407 443
Pakistan
Mirage III 17 16 16 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Mirage V 50 50 62 58 58 58 58 58 58 56
A 5 Fantan 41 41 41 135 135 50 50 50 50 49
Total 108 107 119 211 211 126 126 126 126 125
Fighter
India
MiG 21 FL 200 120 150 200 74 74 74 74 74
MiG 21 bis 108 108 108 170 170
MiG 23 MF 45 45 45 65 65 26 26 26 26 26
Mirage 2000 24 40 40 52 46 36 36 36 35 35
MiG 29 44 40 49 50 54 54 59 59 67
Total 269 249 275 366 361 298 298 303 364 372
Pakistan
F 6 170 170 170 150 150 110 100 100 100 100
F 16 A/B 30 39 39 40 39 39 39 35 34 34
F 7P 20 40 40 75 75 80 79
Mirage III O 30 30
Total 200 209 209 210 229 189 214 210 244 243
Reconnaissance/Survey
India
Gulfstream 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Learjet 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Canberra 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
HS 748 4 4 4 4 4 4
MiG 25 R 8 7 8 8 6 6 6 6 6 6
Total 16 19 20 24 22 22 22 18 18 18
Pakistan
Mirage III (R) 14 13 13 13 12 12 12 12 12 12
E W a/c
India
AWAC S HS 748 4? 2 (test)
ECM Canberra 5 5
Elint B707 2
Attack Helicopters
India
Mi 25/35 16 16 16 32 32 32
Pakistan
AH-1 TOW 10 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance
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TABLE A2.5 IISS: Naval Platforms /Systems
1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96
Submarines
India
Foxtrot 8 8 8 8 8 7 4 4 4 4
Kilo 1 3 6 8 8 8 8 8 8
T 209/1500 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3
Charlie Demo 1 1 1
Total 8 11 14 17 19 17 15 15 15 15
Pakistan
Agosta 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Daphne 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Total 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Midgets 5 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Principal Surface Combat
India
Carriers 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Destroyers 3 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Frigates 21 20 22 19 19 20 20 17 18 18
Total 25 26 29 26 26 27 27 24 25 25
Pakistan
Destroyers 7 7 8 7 3 3 3 3 3 3
Frigates 10 10 10 10 11 6 8
Total 7 7 8 17 13 13 13 14 9 11
Principal Coastal Combat
India
Corvette 4 4 5 8 10 13 14 15 15 17
Missile Craft 14 14 13 13 12 9 8 6 6 6
Mine Warfare 18 18 17 20 20 22 20 20 20 20
Pakistan
Missile Craft 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Mine Warfare 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Amphibious
India
Lct 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Lsm 7 8 9 9 9 8 8 8 8 8
Lcu 4 4 8 8 9 7 7 7 7 7
Maritime Air
India
Landatk-Canb 12 12     ?
Jaguar 8     ? 8 8 8 8 6
Shp Atk Harr 8 8 8 8 18 21 21 23 23 20
Armd Heptrs 25 29 53 53 73 75 75 75 75 75
Asw/Mr Fxd 15 13 18 21 17 22 22 39 38 46
Pakistan
Asw/Mr Fxd 3 3 3 4 5 6 4 4 4 4
Armed Heptrs 10 10 9 10 10 10 9 10 16 13
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance
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